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Professional Integrity and Professional
Regulation: Nonlawyer Practice and
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms
BY DEBORAH L. RHODE*
The American legal profession has a distinguished tradition of
sensitivity to conflicts of interest, except when its own interests are at
issue. This essay explores the compromises to integrity that arises
when a profession controls its own regulatory structure. My
particular focus is the conflicts of interest involved when lawyers
regulate and oversee their own monopoly over the delivery and
financing of legal services.
I. The Structure of Regulation
Around the turn of the twentieth century, state courts began
asserting that they had inherent and exclusive power to regulate the
admission and conduct of lawyers.! That authority, rooted in
constitutional requirements of separation of powers between the
judicial, executive, and legislative branches, has foreclosed legislative
intervention in key areas, including the scope of the professional
monopoly.2 The problem is compounded by the courts' inaccessibility
to lobbying efforts by the public and by their willingness to let bar
*Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law and Director of the Center on the Legal Profession,
Stanford University. This essay draws on THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, 30 (Oxford
University Press 2015).
1. Laurel Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a
Public Forum, 2012 Professional Lawyer 79, 111 (2012); See generally Charles W.
Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation, The Role of the Inherent Powers Doctrine,
12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 1 (1989).
2. Rigertas, supra note I at 112; Charles Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public
Participation in the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 636-41
(1978).
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organizations make most of the decisions on issues of professional
regulation. 3 Although the inherent powers doctrine has served some
salutary purposes in guaranteeing the independence of the profession
from political influence, the cost has been substantial. The effect has
been to protect the profession from competition and public
accountability. As law professor Charles Wolfram has put it, the
doctrine "stands [as] a powerful barrier shielding the legal profession
from any of its critics . . . The legal profession has in that way both
identified and 'protected' the interest of clients and the public
without permitting them to participate in any way in those
processes."4 This lack of participation has shielded the bar from
disinterested insight into problems in its own regulatory framework.'
Discussion here is on the particular difficulties that the inherent
power doctrine poses for issues of nonlawyer competition in
providing routine legal services and investing in law firms.
II. Unauthorized Practice by Nonlawyers
Unlike many other countries, the United States generally bans
legal assistance by nonlawyers regardless of their expertise. In most
jurisdictions, such unauthorized practice of law is a misdemeanor, and
violators are also subject to civil sanctions.6 Although these
prohibitions are frequently violated and only intermittently and
inconsistently enforced, the ban on personalized assistance stands as a
powerful barrier to low-cost assistance. For example, form-processing
services may provide clerical help, but they may not answer questions
about where and when papers must be filed or correct obvious errors.'
A few courts have even held that online document assistance
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law because the services go
beyond clerical support. Only a few states have considered or
3. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167,
1200 (2003) (For inaccessibility); Wolfram, supra note 2 at 16 (for the role of the bar).
4. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 17.
5. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of
the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM L. REv. 129, 154
(2011).
6. Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of law and the Power of State Courts:
Difficult Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 795, 806-07 (2003).
7. Fifteenth Judicial District Unified Bar Association v. Glasgow, 1999 WL 1128847
(Tenn.App. 1999); The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978).
8. In re Reynoso, 477 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (Texas ruling was overturned by a
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implemented licensing systems that enable nonlawyers to provide
limited assistance in specified fields. However, some of these
systems explicitly exclude legal advice. 9
Legislative efforts to expand the contexts in which nonlawyers
may act have generally proven unsuccessful, except with respect to
administrative agency proceedings. In this area, some courts have
allowed nonlawyer representation on the theory either that the
individuals were not giving advice, and therefore not practicing law,
or that public policy justified nonlawyer practice."o For example, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld a system enabling nonlawyers to
represent claimants in unemployment proceedings on the ground that
lay representation had been accepted by the public for fifty years and
"poses no threat to the People of the State of Colorado. Nor is it
interfering with the proper administration of justice. No evidence was
presented to the contrary."" On similar reasoning, federal agencies
have permitted nonlawyers to appear in representative capacities in
many administrative proceedings, and the United States Code
explicitly grants agencies that authority.1 2 Efforts to challenge that
federal authority have failed, but some courts have resisted state
legislative efforts to authorize nonlawyer involvement in state
administrative proceedings.13
Yet the demand for nonlawyer practice has considerably
outstripped the bar's capacity to prevent it. As the chair of
Tennessee's unauthorized practice committee put it,
legislative exemption); Committee v. Parsons Technology, 179 F. 3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999);
Janson v. Legal Zoom.com, No 2:10-Cv-04128 at 20-21 (D. Miss. 2011) (case was
subsequently settled without banning the services altogether; see Tom McNichol, Is
LegalZoom's gain Your Loss?, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, September 2010, at 20.
9. Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a
Public Forum, 2011 JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 79, 114-15, 117-18 (for
description of the California, Arizona, and Washington systems which prevent advice); Don
J. DeBenedictis, State Bar to Weigh Licensing Nonlawyers, SAN FRANCISCO DAILY
JOURNAL, Apr. 11, 2013 (for proposed expansion of the Washington system that would
allow limited license legal technicians and for proposals in California and New York).
10. See Perto v. Board of Review, 654 N.E. 2d 232 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (for a decision
finding no practice of law); Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of Supreme Court of
Colorado v. Employers Unity, Inc., 716 P. 2d 460, 463 (Col. 1986) (for decisions carving
out a public policy exception); Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System
Commission, 619 P. 2d 1036, 1038-39 (Ariz. 1980).
11. Unauthorized Practice ofLaw, 716 P. 2d at 463.
12. 5 U.S.C. §555(b) (1966); see Rigertas supra note 9, at 121.
13. See Turner v. Kentucky Bar Association, 980 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Ky. 1998) (For
resistance). '
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In recent years, it seems every Tom, Dick, and Harriet
have gotten into ... businesses that either constitute the
practice of law or the law business or that are so close,
the border is invisible. Tax consultants, document
production 'mills' such as 'We the People,' and
numerous title insurance and closing companies have
sprung up offering services or advice that cannot be
differentiated from the services offered by licensed
lawyers. 14
Often with no meaningful supervision by lawyers, nonlawyers play
an increasingly important role within organizations in areas like
contracts and compliance."
Despite complaints about unauthorized practice, document
preparation services continue to thrive. For example, LegalZoom
provides legal forms and simple instructions for a variety of legal
needs. This includes business formation, employment agreements,
tax forms, trademark registration, copyright registration, and real
estate leases.1 6 In 2012, the company filed a registration statement
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in anticipation of
going public." According to that statement, the company has served
more than two million customers since its founding in 2002, and nine
out of ten of its surveyed customers reported that they would
recommend LegalZoom to their friends and family.1 8
Although leaders of the organized Bar repeatedly insist that
broad prohibitions on unauthorized practice serve the public's
interest, there is little support for that claim.19 Outside the context of
14. William C. Bevender, Treating the UPL Epidemic, 42 TENN. B.J. 26, 26 (2006).
15. Thomas Morgan, Calling Law a 'Profession" Only Confuses Thinking About the
Challenges Lawyers Face, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 542, 564 (2011); Susan Hackett, Inside
Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends in the In-House Profession, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
609, 616 (2002).
16. Our Products and Services, LegalZoom, http://www.legalzoom.com/prducts-and-
services.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
17. LegalZoom.com, Inc. Registration Statement (Form S-1) (May 10, 2012), http:
//www.sec.gov/Arhives/edgar/data/1286139/0001047469120056763/a22090200zx-1.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
18. Id.
19. See Nicholas J. Wallwork, UPL Harms Public, Lawyers and Consumer Confidence,
ARIZ. ATT'Y (February, 2002) (for bar claims).
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immigration, it is rare for customers to assert injury or for suits to be
filed by consumer protection agencies. 2 0 The vast majority of
Unauthorized Practice of Law, or "UPL," lawsuits filed against cyber
lawyer products, is brought by lawyers or unauthorized practice
committees and generally settle without examples of harm.2 1 In other
nations that permit nonlawyers to provide legal advice and assist with
routine documents, the evidence available suggests that their
performance is adequate. 22 In a study comparing outcomes for low-
income clients in the United Kingdom, nonlawyers generally
outperformed lawyers in terms of concrete results and client
satisfaction on a variety of matters, including welfare benefits,
housing, and employment. 23 After reviewing their own and other
empirical studies, the authors concluded that "it is specialization, not
professional status, which appears to be the best predictor of
quality." 24 In Ontario, Canada, which allows licensed paralegals to
represent individuals in minor court cases and administrative tribunal
proceedings, a five-year review concluded there were "solid levels of
[public] satisfaction with the services received." 25 In the United States,
studies show that lay specialists who provide legal representation in
bankruptcy and administrative agency hearings generally perform as
well or better than attorneys. Extensive formal training is less critical
than daily experience for effective advocacy. 26
Almost all of the experts and commissions that have studied this
issue recommend increased opportunities for such assistance. Until
recently, almost all judges and bar associations have ignored those
20. Rigertas supra note 9, at 124; Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized
Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709,725 (2012) (Evidence
of harm from internet legal provision of assistance is sparse).
21. Rotenbergsupra note 20, at 722.
22. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 89 (Oxford University Press 2005); Jack
A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth (Nineteenth)
Century Straightjacket: Something has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 464 (2014).
Julian Lonbay, Assessing the European Market for Legal Services: Developments in the
Free Movement of Lawyers in the European Union, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1629, 1636
(2010) (discussing Swedish legal advice providers).
23. Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting professionalism: Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in
England and Wales, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 765, 785-87 (2003); see Deborah J. Cantrell,
The Obligation ofLegal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 883, 888-90 (2004).
24. Moorhead et al, supra note 23, at 795.
25. David B. Morris, Report to the Attorney General of Ontario (November 2012) at 12.
26. HERBERT KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT WORK 76,
108, 148, 190, 201 (University of Michigan Press 1998).
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recommendations.27 There are, however, some signs of change. The
ready access to online documents has fed desires for self-
representation and for low-cost assistance in routine matters. New
York and California are considering licensing structures, and
Washington has implemented one for certain specialties. 28 Because the
goal is to protect clients from incompetence, it makes sense to pursue
regulation, rather than further prohibition of lay specialists.
The need for such a regulatory system is particularly apparent in
the area of immigration, a field characterized by both pervasive fraud
and pervasive unmet needs. 29 Individuals holding themselves out as
notaries and immigration consultants have preyed on the ignorance of
undocumented consumers who cannot afford attorneys. Many of these
consultants capitalize on the status of notario publicos in some Latin
American countries, where these legal professionals enjoy formal legal
training and authority to provide legal assistance.30 Undocumented
residents who are victims of "notario fraud" are often unwilling to
approach authorities to complain out of fear of exposing their illegal
status and risking deportation. The situation would benefit from a
licensing structure similar to that in Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. These systems allow for licensed nonlawyer experts to
provide immigration-related assistance.31 Although the United States
allows accredited nonlawyers to represent individuals in immigration
appeals, it permits only representatives who work for nonprofit
27. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice, 42 Loy. LAW. REV.
869, 885-86 (2009).
28. See DeBenedictis supra note 9 at 1.
29. See Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal Service Providers: Inadequate
Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 577, 589 (2009) (for fraud);
Jessica Wesberg and Bridget O'Shea, Fake Lawyers and Notaries Prey on Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011 at A25; see Erin B. Corcoran, Bypassing Civil Gideon: A Legislative
Proposal to Address the Rising Costs and Unmet Legal Needs of Unrepresented
Immigrants, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 643, 654-55 (2012) (for unmet need).
30. Ann E. Langford, What's In a Name? Notarios in the United States and the
Exploitation of a Vulnerable Latino Immigrant Population, 7 HARV. LATrNO L. REv. 115,
119-20 (2004).
31. See Information for Consumers, Australian Government Office of the Migration
Agents Registration Authority, https://www.mara.gov.au/Consumer-Information/Informa
tion-for-Consumers/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2015); see Use an Authorized
Immigration Representative, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, http://www.cic.ge.ca/eng
lish/information/representative/rep-who.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (For the role of
authorized immigration consultants in Canada); see The Code of Standards: The
Commissioner's Rules, Office of The Immigration Services Commissioner, http://oisc.home
office.gov.uk/servefile.aspx?docid=6 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015) (For the role of regulated
immigration advisors in the United Kingdom).
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organizations and who accept only nominal fees for their efforts. 32
Expanding the accreditation and oversight system would allow
qualified lay experts to charge reasonable fees for assistance and
would increase access to justice for a population in great need of
assistance.3
Similar regulatory systems could be developed in other contexts
to allow personalized assistance on routine matters. Various consumer
protections could be required concerning qualifications, disclaimers,
malpractice liability and insurance and so forth.34 Consistent with their
inherent powers, courts could approve or oversee the development of
such systems in accordance with the public interest. A number of
courts have already taken such approaches in evaluating unauthorized
practice claims. After considering factors such as cost, availability of
services, and consumer convenience, the Washington State Supreme
Court held that it was in the public interest for licensed real estate
brokers to complete standard form agreements.35 This consumer-
oriented approach is a more socially defensible regulatory structure,
unlike the conventional ban on nonlawyer practice, which ignores
quality and cost-effectiveness.
III. Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms
The financing of legal services is a second area where the
involvement of nonlawyers makes increasing sense. Nonlawyer
ownership of law firms is permitted in Australia, England, Wales,
Scotland, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and parts of
Canada.3 6 However, the American Bar Association's Ethics 20/20
Commission tabled a modest proposal for similar nonlawyer
investment in the United States. The proposal would have required
that firms engage only in legal practice, nonlawyer investment be
capped at twenty-five percent, nonlawyers be actively engaged in the
32. See 8 Code of Federal Regulation, § 1292.1 (2012); Shannon supra note 29, at 602-03.
33. See Emily A. Unger, Solving Immigration Consultant Fraud Through Expanded
Federal Accreditation, 29 LAW & INEQ. 425 (2011); Careen Shannon, To License or Not to
License? A Look at Differing Approaches to Policing the Activities of Nonlawyer
Immigration Service Providers, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 437 (2001).
34. Steven Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 365, 417 (2013).
35. Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, 694 P.2d 630 (Washington 1985).
36. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/0, For Comment, Issues Paper Concerning
Alternative Business Structures 7-17 (Apr. 5, 2011).
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enterprise, and nonlawyers pass a fit-to-own test similar to the
character and fitness test required for entrance to the bar.37
Opposition to such investment rests on three concerns. The first
is that shareholder preoccupation with profits would pose a threat to
professional independence. 38 The American Bar Association's Model
Rule 5.4, which prohibits sharing fees with nonlawyers, justifies the
prohibition as necessary "to protect the lawyer's professional
independence of judgment."39 According to the Reporter for the
Ethics 20/20 Commission, opponents' concern is that nonlawyers
who are not subject to the bar's code of ethics might push lawyers
"to chase the dollar rather than abid[e] by the rules of professional
conduct." 40 Symbolic and status issues are also at stake. To some
commentators, nonlawyer investment would mean "diluting the
essence of what it means to be a lawyer." 4 1 If Wal-Mart could own
law firms, law professor Lawrence Fox predicts that "it will be the
end of the profession . . . We will become just another set of service
providers." 42
These arguments lack any evidence of such problems in the
jurisdictions that permit nonlawyer ownership. The ABA's Ethics
20/20 Commission reviewed the experience of the District of
Columbia, which has permitted nonlawyer ownership interests in law
firms for over two decades, and found no record of disciplinary
concerns. 4 3 Nor did it report any ethical difficulties in Australia or
England, which have more recently permitted nonlawyer investment.
Both countries require appointment of a legal director or head of
37. Id. at 7-19.
38. Katherine H. Reardon, It's Not Your Business! A Critique of the UK Legal Services
Act of 2007 and Why Nonlaw~yers Should Not Own or Manage Law Firms in the United
States, 40 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 155 (2012); New York State Bar Association,
Report of the Task Force on Nonlawyer Ownership 73-74 (Nov. 17, 2012).
39. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.4, Comment (2013).
40. John Eligon, Selling Pieces of Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, at B1
(quoting Andrew Perlman, reporter for Ethics 20/20 Commission).
41. Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Split Over Nonlawyer Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,
2012 at BI (Quoting David J. Carr).
42. 'Trio of Federal Suits Challenge Ethics Rule That Stops Private Equity Investment
in Firms,' 27 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, 382 (2011) (quoting
Lawrence Fox).
43. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, Discussion Paper on Alternative Practice
Structures 4 (Dec. 2, 2011).
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practice to ensure compliance with ethical obligations.4 4 Both
countries also subject alternative business structures to the same
ethical rules as those governing legal professionals, including
confidentiality.4 5 Slater and Gordon, the Australian law firm that was
the first in the world to become a publicly traded company, made
clear in its prospectus that obligations to courts and clients take
precedence over the interests of shareholders.46 Moreover, there are
already many American contexts in which nonlawyers are involved
in a managerial capacity where strategies have emerged to preserve
professional independence and confidentiality: government agencies,
insurance defense, group legal service plans, and in-house corporate
legal departments.47
Also missing from opponents' arguments is adequate
consideration of the benefits that might follow from the infusion of
capital and talent. Equity financing holds a number of advantages
over traditional financing approaches, which rely on the capital
contributions of partners or outside borrowing. As law professor
Milton Regan notes, a "partnership's capital base is limited to the
wealth of its partners, and its assets are mobile." 48 In an era of
increasing lateral movement, partners who are uncertain about their
own or their colleagues' future plans may be reluctant to invest in
firms' long-term needs. These partners may be equally wary of
assuming loan obligations that will leave them liable for firm debt if
others depart. Excessive reliance on loans is one of the precipitating
causes of law firm dissolution.49 At the same time, the demand for
alternative sources of capital is growing in light of globalization,
nationalization, and technological advances. The need to service
clients in multiple locations has fueled expansion that depends on
additional resources. So too, developing information technology is
44. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business
Structures 15 (Apr. 5, 2011).
45. Id. at 9, 15.
46. Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 555 (2009).
47. Guttenberg supra note 22, at 1, 473-74.
48. Milton C. Regan, Tr. Lawyers, Symbols and Money: Outside Investment in Law
Firms, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 407, 422 (2008).
49. See Tyler Cobb, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: Appropriately Harnessing the
Advantages of Nonlawyer Ownership, 54 ARIz. L. REv. 765, 777 (2012); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, LAWYERS AS LEADERS 167-172 (Oxford University Press 2013).
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highly capital intensive.5 0
Initiatives to better serve consumer interests would benefit from
collaboration with professionals in marketing, finance systems,
engineering, project management and similar occupations."
Research shows, innovation is often the result of interactions among
those in related fields.52 As Richard Susskind notes, just as librarians
did not create Google, lawyers may not create tomorrow's
breakthroughs in the delivery of legal services.53 The desire to attract
and retain outside investors may also "tend to impose
financial.. .discipline on law firms whose members have not
experienced serious pressure to exercise it." 5 4
The need for outside capital and expertise is particularly acute in
the marketing of routine assistance. The prospect of legal services at
Wal-Mart prices, however distasteful to lawyers, is likely to be
appealing to many consumers. The chain already offers a variety of
professional services; including medical, dental, and eye care; and
law would be a logical next step. A similar evolution has already
begun in England. WH Smith, a London-based chain, offers legal
advice on divorce, wills, real estate transactions, and basic contracts
through legal kiosks run in partnership with QualitySolicitors.5 5 Co-
operative Legal Services (CLS), an offshoot of a supermarket, offers
legal assistance often packaged with other related services.56 As
Renee Knake puts it, outside investment may "democratize" the
delivery of legal services in ways that dramatically expand access to
justice for underserved consumers. 57  This claim is also the
underlying basis for a recent lawsuit challenging the ban on outside
investment. Law firm Jacoby and Meyer needs external capital to
50. Rotenbergsupra note 21, at 729, 738-741.
51. William D. Henderson and Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, ABA JOURNAL,
40, 45-47 (2011).
52. STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
INNOVATION, 41, 58, 166, 246 (Penguin 2010).
53. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL
SERVICES, 254 (Oxford University Press, 2008).
54. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, 170 (Oxford University
Press 2010).
55. Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 7 (2012).
56. John Flood, Will there be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for the Legal
Profession after the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. STATE L. REV. 537, 557 (2012).
57. Knake supra note 55, at 557.
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finance its efforts to realize economies of scale in delivering
affordable routine assistance.58
In an era where four-fifths of low-income consumers and a
majority of middle-income consumer have unmet legal needs, we
urgently need more innovative delivery and financing structures.59
"Equal Access Under Law" is a slogan we put on courthouse doors;
it by no means describes what goes on behind them. That needs to
change and the profession's control over its own monopoly is part of
what stands in the way.
58. Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of the App. Div., 847 F.Supp.2d 590
(2nd Cir. 2012).
59. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, 30 (Oxford University Press
2015).
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